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Adorno on Hope 
 
In this paper I argue that Theodor W. Adorno’s philosophy articulates a radical conception of 
hope. This may come as a surprise to readers who associate Adorno with some of his bleakest 
pronouncements on the state of human civilization and its future prospects. After all, he is 
notorious for his claims that ‘all post-Auschwitz culture…is garbage’ (ND 359/367), and that 
while there is no direct line from savagery to humanitarianism, there is one from the slingshot 
to the megaton bomb (ND 314/320). These claims have given rise to a bourgeoning literature 
on Adorno’s conception of progress (Allen 2016), but commentators have paid comparatively 
little attention to his conception of hope.1 I argue that this is unfortunate for two reasons. 
First, if Adorno’s philosophy is to serve the anticipatory-utopian as well as the explanatory-
diagnostic function of critical social theory (Benhabib 1996: 226, Allen 2016), then it must 
articulate a conception of hope in order to justify why hope rather than despair is the 
appropriate response to the devastating state of the world that it has diagnosed. Thus, my 
argument in this paper, if successful, will make a contribution to understanding the critical 
purchase of Adorno’s philosophy. Second, Adorno’s conception of hope is of wider interest 
for philosophical discussions of hope, because it occupies a distinct position in the conceptual 
landscape. It shares important features with one of the most prominent conceptions of hope, 
articulated in Jonathan Lear’s book, Radical Hope (2006), while differing from it in at least 
one important respect. While Lear’s conception of radical hope is about a future that is 
radically different from the past, it depends on the continued affirmation of the meaning and 
value of the past. In contrast, for Adorno, the Holocaust has thrown the meaning and value of 
our past into radical doubt, and so his conception of radical hope must do without any 
positive appeal to our past. Thus, it may serve as a useful alternative for philosophers who are 
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attracted to Lear’s conception of radical hope but troubled by its dependence on the 
affirmation of the past.2 
 
I begin my argument with a brief discussion of Lear’s conception of radical hope and an 
initial sketch how Adorno’s conception of it differs from Lear’s (§1). Next, I turn to 
Adorno’s criticism of Kant’s conception of hope, because Adorno develops his conception of 
hope through a critique of Kantian hope. I argue that Kant has a specific conception of hope 
that differs from both ordinary and radical hope through its rational constraints. Adorno 
believes that these constraints of Kantian hope can no longer be met and, therefore, only a 
radical conception of hope can be defended (§2). However, Adorno’s own experience shows 
that hope is not entirely voluntary and potentially dangerous, if it tips over into a positive 
picture of a better, future world (§3). In particular, there is a regressive metaphysical need to 
believe in such a better, future world, but Adorno argues that the right response to this danger 
is to have the courage to know the worst (§4). Only then genuine hope will follow. Finally, I 
briefly look at two reasons for hope that can be found in Adorno’ work (§5). 
 
 
1. Negativism and Radical Hope 
Lear introduces the concept of radical hope in order to make sense of the comportment of the 
Crow Chief Plenty Coups as he led his tribe through a period of cultural devastation. During 
his lifetime, Plenty Coups experienced the end of the Crow way of life, which revolved 
around hunting and warfare. When the Crow had to stop hunting Buffalo, move onto a 
reservation and cease warfare, they lost not only the material basis of their way of life, but 
also the entire horizon of meaning and value that had informed their life, their poetry, and 
their rituals. Lear shows how Plenty Coups responded to this cultural devastation with great 
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courage, making creative decisions, such as leading his tribe into a pact with the American 
forces against the Sioux, negotiating with Washington politicians and achieving good 
outcomes for the Crow in a difficult political environment. Plenty Coup’s courage was 
underpinned by radical hope that the Crow would flourish again, a hope that he traced back to 
a childhood dream (I will return to this dream below).  
 
What, then, is radical hope? According to Lear, ‘[w]hat makes…hope radical is that it is 
directed toward a future goodness that transcends the current ability to understand what it is. 
Radical hope anticipates a good for which those who have the hope as yet lack the 
appropriate concepts with which to understand it’ (Lear 2006: 103). Elsewhere in the book, 
Lear writes that it is a commitment to the ‘bare idea’ or ‘possibility…that something good 
will emerge (Lear 2006: 94, 97). If ordinary hope is the desire for a good outcome that is 
neither certain nor impossible, but whose goodness is well understood by the person who 
desires it3, radical hope is the desire for an outcome where the ground of its desirability, that 
is, its goodness, transcends the current abilities of those who desire it to understand what it is. 
It is a desire for a future that therefore can only be grasped as good retrospectively, if and 
when it has eventuated and equipped people with concepts with which they can understand it 
(Lear 2006: 115).  
 
It is easy to see why Adorno’s conception of hope must share important features with 
Lear’s conception of radical hope. According to most interpretations, Adorno’s critical social 
theory is negativistic. As Fabian Freyenhagen has argued, this negativism takes four forms 
(Freyenhagen 2013: 3–5, 2017: 862). First, Adorno is an epistemic negativist who believes 
that we currently cannot know what the good is or what happiness is. Second, this epistemic 
negativism means that Adorno must be a methodological negativist; he thinks that 
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philosophers should investigate negative phenomena, such as pain and suffering, rather than 
positive ones, such as the good or happiness, in order to elaborate their theories. Third, more 
specifically, Freyenhagen argues that Adorno, therefore, should be read as a meta-ethical 
negativist who accounts for the normative force of his ethics through an appeal to what is bad 
for human beings, rather than through an appeal to what is good for them or what makes 
them happy (Freyenhagen 2013: chapters 7–9). Finally, and most controversially, 
Freyenhagen argues that Adorno subscribes to epistemic negativism (and therefore to 
methodological and meta-ethical negativism), because he is a substantive negativist who 
believes that the modern world is bad or, as he often puts it, radically evil, rather than good. 
Substantive negativism is controversial, because it seems to imply that the world does not 
contain anything positive, all things considered. Any seeming goodness or happiness is either 
fleeting or tainted by its entanglements in the radically evil world (Freyenhagen 2013: 10–11, 
2017: 870; cf. Theunissen 1983: 47).  
 
To be sure, one may doubt the plausibility of substantive negativism, and it is not entirely 
clear what status it has in Adorno’s critical social theory. If it is meant to be a factual claim, it 
is hard to see how it could be demonstrated. How could one show that, as a matter of fact, no 
genuine goodness or happiness does exist in the current social world? If it is a normative 
judgment about the current social world, people may reasonably disagree whether the evil 
that undoubtedly exists or has existed (for example, during the Holocaust), in fact, does taint 
all goodness and happiness in the present, or whether there are ‘features of our lives…that are 
not falsely meaningful’ (and, presumably, good), for example in personal relationships 
(O’Connor 2017: 858). Of course, even if one doubts the plausibility of substantive 
negativism, one still may endorse epistemic negativism and remain agnostic about the 
existence of genuine goodness or happiness, because the radical evil that pervades the current 
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social world makes it impossible to know whether any genuine goodness or happiness exists 
or to identify it reliably. As we shall see, much of Adorno’s argument does not depend on 
substantive negativism, but it does make a difference when it comes to understanding why 
Adorno thinks that we have reasons for hope (see my discussion in §5 below).  
 
In addition, Adorno’s reflections on hope reveal that he endorses a fifth form of 
negativism. He is an imaginative negativist who thinks that we cannot conceive or imagine 
what the good would look like. Imaginative negativism is a distinct form of negativism and 
more radical than epistemic negativism, because imagining is not constrained by the 
epistemic norms of knowledge acquisition, and, therefore, we reasonably can imagine much 
more than we can know. However, there is clear evidence that Adorno denies our ability to 
imagine the good. Thus, in one well-known passage, he writes: ‘In the right condition 
everything would be, as in the Jewish theologoumenon, only the slightest bit different from 
what it is now, but not the slightest thing can be imagined [vorstellen] about how it would 
then be’ (ND 294/352). Similarly, discussing the ‘supremacy’ of objective reality in 
determining what we can think, he writes:   
Whoever presents an image of the right conditions, in order to answer the objection 
that he does not know what he wants, cannot disregard that supremacy [which 
extends] also over him. Even if his imagination [Phantasie] were capable of 
imagining [vorzustellen] everything as radically different, it would still remain 
chained to him and his present time as static points of reference, and everything 
would be askew. (ND 345/35) 
 
Like epistemic negativism, one can endorse imaginative negativism without endorsing 
substantive negativism, because the radically evil world taints our imagination.4   
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While Plenty Coups’ radical hope is a response to the end of the traditional Crow way of 
life, the historical background of Adorno’s discussion of negativism is the Holocaust, 
although his methodological negativism may precede it. Adorno sees the Holocaust as the 
culmination of the realisation of evil in the world, after which nothing can remain as it was 
before, and everything, including philosophy, must be questioned as to its compatibility or 
even complicity with the bad. Adorno certainly thought that he was writing in the face of 
cultural devastation as much as Plenty Coups was, albeit for different reasons. Whereas the 
Crow Chief faced a future that would no longer contain the Crow way of life, Adorno and his 
contemporaries faced a future in which they no longer could appeal to the idea of human 
progress or the belief in the ultimate goodness of existence.  
 
This difference between the two cases points to a very important difference between the 
two conceptions of radical hope. While Plenty Coup faced a future that would be radically 
different from his past, he was not forced to question the very meaning and value of the Crow 
past. Crow history up to then had not been rendered meaningless or valueless in virtue of the 
fact that the Crow way of life would come to an end. In fact, Lear’s speculative 
reconstruction of Plenty Coups’ thought sees his hope as being rooted in a deep commitment 
to the existence of a transcendent goodness in the world that makes it possible to hope for a 
‘revival’ of the traditional Crow way of life, albeit in a form that is not yet intelligible (Lear 
2006: 95). To see this, recall that the immediate source of Plenty Coups’ radical hope was a 
childhood dream, which plays an important role in Crow mythology. Following a ritual that 
many young Crow underwent, Plenty Coups elicited this dream during a lonely fast in a 
remote place, after chopping off a fingertip and pleading with God to pity him (Lear 2006: 
66). This establishes a continuity between the past and the unknown future ahead, which is 
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underpinned by faith and tradition, even though neither faith nor tradition can give Plenty 
Coups any direct guidance on how to face the unknown future.5 
 
In contrast, for Adorno, the Holocaust has thrown the meaning and value of our past into 
radical doubt. Reason itself has lost any semblance of innocence, and therefore we cannot 
appeal to it in any straightforward way in order to orient ourselves in our attitudes to either 
the past or the future. In particular, Adorno and Horkheimer’s genealogy of reason in 
Dialectic of Enlightenment aimed to show that the rise of instrumental reason rendered the 
natural world meaningless while shedding the normative content of reason itself. From the 
standpoint of the present, the disenchanted world that resulted from this process offers neither 
meaningful resources that can help us to imagine a better future nor robust values that would 
enable us to judge what such a future ought to be like.6 This analysis gives Adorno a different 
reason from Plenty Coups’ for why any hope for the future must be radical hope. His 
epistemic and imaginative negativism about the good with its roots in the experience of the 
Holocaust leads Adorno to argue that any determinate picture of the future will be informed 
by the badness of the current world and therefore tainted. 
 
This background enables us to understand an otherwise puzzling claim that Adorno 
makes in the Introduction to Negative Dialectics. He writes: ‘It is always the possible (das 
Mögliche), never the immediately actual (das unmittelbar Wirkliche), that blocks the path to 
utopia…’ (ND 66/57).7 One way of interpreting this claim is to note that the immediately 
actual and utopia do not share the same conceptual space, whereas the possible and utopia 
do.8 Utopia, for Adorno, refers to a possible future that radically and totally differs from the 
past and present. As he put it in a conversation with Ernst Bloch: 
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Whatever utopia is, whatever can be imagined as utopia, this is the transformation of 
the totality. And the imagination of such a transformation of the totality is basically 
very different in all the so-called utopian accomplishments [viz. those made possible 
by technological progress; TJ] – which, incidentally, are all really like you say: very 
modest, very narrow. It seems to me that what people have lost subjectively in regard 
to consciousness is very simply the capability to imagine the totality as something that 
could be completely different. (Quoted in Bloch 1987: 3–4) 
 
Utopia is a future in which the forces of domination that characterise our radically evil world 
no longer blight human practices from cognition to social relations9, but it reflects the 
determinate negation of existing domination and evil and does not issue in the depiction of a 
positive future (Bloch 1987: 12). In contrast, ‘the possible’ refers to a possible future that we 
can imagine, name or depict in the here and now as a concrete possible future. However, 
given Adorno’s commitment to epistemic and imaginative negativism, according to which no 
future good is knowable or imaginable, any possible future that we can imagine and name as 
a concrete possible future may be tainted by the badness of the actual world. This also 
constrains our ability to reliably imagine possible futures that would be radically different 
from ours, that is, no longer characterised by the forces of domination that characterise our 
actual world.10 For Adorno, hope that clings to the possible in this, more determinate sense, 
ordinary rather than radical hope, serves ideological purposes. It portrays a seemingly utopian 
future with the conceptual and imaginative resources of the bad world and, therefore, blocks 
the path to a genuine utopia. For example, in the ‘Meditations on Metaphysics’ Adorno 
writes  
The idea of a fullness of life, including those which socialist conceptions hold out to 
human beings, is not the utopia for which it mistakes itself, because that fullness is 
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inseparable from greed, from what the Jugendstil called ‘living life to the full’, a 
demand that implies violence and subjugation. (ND 371/378) 
 
If we imagine the socialist utopia as a state in which people can fulfil their wanton desires, 
try out everything, and never suffer, we succumb to a primitive picture of the good that 
doesn’t question the character of our desires or what a truly fulfilled life would be like. Like 
the theological Bilderverbot, to which Adorno frequently refers (e.g. ND 207/207), negative 
dialectics eschews concrete images of utopia in order to avoid ideological traps. All that is 
left is radical hope, which does not depend on such concrete images of the good, and 
therefore is hope for a genuine utopia.  
 
 
2. Adorno’s Criticism of Kantian Hope 
In Negative Dialectics, Adorno develops his conception of radical hope through a critique of 
Kant’s conception of hope. According to Adorno, Kant’s critical philosophy is guided by a 
‘rescuing urge [Begierde des Rettens]’ (ND 378/385), that is, the urge to rescue or salvage the 
achievements of dogmatic metaphysics in a non-dogmatic way. These achievements include 
the objectivity of experience as well as the ‘cardinal propositions of metaphysics’, freedom of 
the will, the existence of God, and the immortality of the soul.11 Adorno offers a 
characterisation of Kant’s predicament with regard to metaphysics that gives it a time-
diagnostic thrust.  
Kant’s rescue of the intelligible sphere is not merely the Protestant apologetics known 
to all; it also attempts to intervene in the dialectic of enlightenment at the point where 
it terminates in the abolition of reason itself. The construction of immortality as a 
Postulate of Pure Practical Reason bears witness to the fact that Kant’s rescuing urge 
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lies much deeper than simply in the pious wish to preserve something of the 
traditional ideas amidst nominalism and against it. It condemns the intolerability of 
the existing [world] and strengthens the spirit that recognises it. That no inner-worldly 
improvement suffices to do justice to the dead; that none touches on the unjustness of 
death, moves Kantian reason to hope against reason. The secret of his philosophy is 
the unthinkability of despair. (ND 377–78/385) 
  
The ‘dialectic of enlightenment’ describes a process of disenchantment that is philosophical 
and social at once. The critique of reason determines the limits of reason’s legitimate use. 
According to Adorno (and Horkheimer), this critique leaves the object domain of theoretical 
reason, that is, nature, disenchanted or meaningless at the same time as scientific progress 
enables humanity to control nature to an unprecedented degree. The limits of reason are 
twofold: on the one hand, human knowledge does not extend to things in themselves; on the 
other hand, it does not extend beyond the realm of possible experience.12 As the result, 
increasing success in the domination of nature coincides with a decrease in the possibilities of 
metaphysical experience, including the possibilities of religious faith, because the critique of 
reason leaves it with a realm of pure immanence that offers no conceptual space for such 
transcendent experience. In this context, Kant ‘intervenes’ in the dialectic of enlightenment 
with his famous declaration that he ‘had to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith’ 
(Bxxx). His ‘rescue of the intelligible sphere’ and the Postulates of Pure Practical Reason are 
the results of this intervention.   
 
I believe that Adorno is sympathetic to the position in which Kant finds himself, but he 
criticises the manner in which Kant tries to extricate himself from it.13 In particular, Adorno 
criticises Kant for postulating God’s existence and the immortality of the soul as Postulates 
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of Pure Practical Reason, because these Postulates ‘populate’ the intelligible sphere with 
concrete transcendent possibilities, which have to be affirmed in thought. This move 
establishes Kantian hope as a third form of hope between ordinary and radical hope. As we 
shall see, Kantian hope differs from ordinary hope in that its rationality depends on our belief 
in transcendent objects. However, Kantian hope also differs from radical hope in that it gives 
content to an intelligible sphere, rather than limiting itself to a bare commitment to the 
possibility of transcendence. 
 
At this point, it is important to spell out exactly the relationship between the Postulates of 
Pure Practical Reason and Kantian hope, because it is easy to miss both the distinction 
between moral belief and hope and the way in which the former makes the latter possible.14 
Thus, commentators often assume that the objects of the Postulates, especially God and 
immortality, are the objects of Kantian hope (O’Neill 1996, Flikschuh 2009). If this was 
right, Kantian hope would be a form of radical or unimaginable hope, because the Postulates 
outstrip our conceptual abilities to comprehend them (Martin 2014: 103–104). However, as 
Andrew Chignell has pointed out, Kant believes that ‘what may I hope?’ is a question for the 
philosophy of religion, rather than for the critique of reason (Chignell 2013, 2014). On this 
reading, Kant argues that we have good reasons to believe or have faith (Glauben) in, rather 
than hope for, God’s existence and the immortality of our soul. And it is this belief that 
warrants Kantian hope for God’s assistance in our quest for moral perfection (Rel 171), for 
happiness in proportion to virtue (A809/B837; KpV 122–25), and for the establishment of an 
ethical community on earth (Rel 94). Thus, the Postulates themselves are not the objects of 
hope, because while moral belief is not knowledge, or, logical certainty, it is stronger than 
hope, namely, moral certainty (Chignell 2013: 198). As Kant puts it:  
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The conviction is not logical but moral certainty, and, since it depends on subjective 
grounds (of moral disposition) I must not even say ‘It is morally certain that there is a 
God,’ etc., but rather ‘I am morally certain’ etc. That is, the belief in a God and 
another world is so interwoven with my moral disposition that I am in as little danger 
of ever surrendering the former as I am worried that the latter can ever be torn away 
from me. (A828–29/B857–58) 
The purpose of the Postulates is to provide the real ground for hope and, therefore, to 
make Kantian hope rational hope. To see this, consider what the rational constraints on 
rational hope are, according to Kant. Following Chignell’s reconstruction, ‘S’s hope that p is 
rational only if S at least rationally believes that p is really possible’ (Chignell 2013: 209). 
‘Real possibility’ is a technical term in Kant and refers to a possibility whose actualization 
has a real ground, that is, something exists which makes it possible for the possibility to be 
actualized. This distinguishes real possibility from mere logical possibility, which only 
requires that its actualization would not be contradictory.15 The upshot of this brief detour 
into Kant’s modal metaphysics is that Kantian hope for a better, future world requires moral 
belief in God’s existence and the immortality of the soul, because God and immortality 
provide the real ground for the possible actualization of the hoped-for outcomes. Belief in the 
Postulates of Pure Practical Reason warrants hope. Read in this light, Adorno’s discussion of 
the Postulates should be understood as arguing that, after the Holocaust, we are no longer 
warranted in believing the Postulates of Pure Practical Reason to be true, and, therefore, we 
have no rational warrant for Kantian hope.16     
 
Adorno’s first argument against Kant’s Postulates concerns the compatibility of our 
experiences in the actual world with any possible, better world. In particular, Adorno argues 
that the experience of the Holocaust forces us to re-evaluate the traditional conception of 
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metaphysics, which underwrites our hope for a better future, and which he also ascribes to 
Kant. According to this conception of metaphysics, ‘the immutable is truth and the mutable, 
transient is semblance [Schein]’, so that there is a ‘mutual indifference between temporal 
things and eternal ideas’ (ND 354/361). As a result, nothing that happens in the actual world 
should, in principle, undermine our belief in an ideal, transcendent order that would 
vouchsafe our future redemption and enable us to reconcile ourselves to our actual world. 
However, according to Adorno, the Holocaust has destroyed any sense that an appeal to 
transcendent entities can endow immanent experience with a positive meaning. It ‘make[s] a 
mockery of the construction of immanence as endowed with meaning radiated by an 
affirmatively posited transcendence’ (ND 354/361). Philosophers of history cannot integrate 
the Holocaust into a progressive historical narrative; no theodicy is possible in the post-
Auschwitz world. As a result, our ‘ability to engage in metaphysics is paralysed because what 
happened shattered the basis on which speculative metaphysical thought could be reconciled 
with experience’ (ND 354/361–62). This sentiment is often expressed in terms of the inability 
to believe in God after Auschwitz. 
 
Historical-philosophical reflection turns the table on traditional conceptions of 
metaphysics insofar as it takes an immanent event, the Holocaust, and its consequences, 
inexpressible suffering, as index veri for the transcendent. ‘The course of history forces 
materialism upon metaphysics, traditionally the direct antithesis of materialism’ (ND 
358/365). Adorno’s Meditations bring metaphysics into a dialectical relationship with the 
empirical world: not only does metaphysics orient us in our empirical life, but our empirical 
life constrains what our metaphysics can be. This is broadly compatible with Kant, who also 
believes that our metaphysical commitments ultimately are motivated by moral concerns. 
However, Adorno thinks that after Auschwitz ‘[n]o word tinged from on high, not even a 
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theological one, has any right unless it underwent a transformation’ (ND 360/367). On this 
view, the Holocaust has created a sphere of pure immanence, where no appeal to 
transcendent ideals is possible and everything that can be thought at all is immanent in the 
empirical world. If this is true, then the question becomes whether ‘metaphysical experience’, 
and therefore, Kantian hope, is still possible (ND 365/372, see also my discussion in §5).  
 
Adorno’s second argument against Kant concerns the immortality of the soul, a belief that 
occupies a central place in Christian thought and, therefore, also in traditional metaphysics in 
the Western philosophical tradition. Adorno’s argument parallels the argument about a future, 
better world. He argues that our recent historical experience has robbed us of what made 
death bearable in the past, namely, ‘the feeling of its epic unity with the rounded 
[gerundeten] life’ (ND 362/369). Of course, Adorno is aware of the dubious character that 
this solace takes when he writes that old and tired people feel that it is right for them to die 
because their lives were already not lived any longer in any emphatic sense. Nevertheless, in 
our administered society (der vergesellschafteten Gesellschaft) even that solace is absent and 
death has become incommensurable with life. Furthermore, Adorno suggests that our 
knowledge of the Holocaust deprives us of the hope of an afterlife. 
Death in the camps is a new horror: since Auschwitz, fearing death means fearing 
worse than death. What death does to the socially condemned can be anticipated 
biologically on old people we love; not only their bodies but their egos [ihr Ich], 
everything that determined them as human, crumbles without illness or violent 
intervention. The remnant of confidence in their transcendent endurance vanishes 
during their life on earth, so to speak: what should be the part of them that is not 
dying? (ND 364/371)17 
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Adorno seems to say that certain forms of life make it impossible to believe in immortality, 
because in them people have no sense of being alive, being subjects, having worthwhile 
experiences even during their lives.18 
 
Taken together, if Adorno is right, these arguments suggest that our experience of life has 
rendered belief in God’s existence and our immortality problematic for reasons to do with our 
experience in the actual world. Adorno speaks of the ‘historical-philosophical collapse of the 
metaphysical ideas’ (ND 365/372), which renders them absurd. However, since the Postulates 
of Pure Practical Reasons provide the warrant for the rationality of Kantian hope, the demise 
of the Postulates also renders Kantian hope for God’s assistance in our quest for moral 
perfection, happiness in proportion to virtue, and the establishment of an ethical community 
on earth irrational. 
 
Of course, these arguments are open to objections. In particular, defenders of Kant could 
deny that any empirical arguments can undermine our moral beliefs in God and immortality. 
Kant suggests as much in the Jäsche Logic, where he argues that moral belief is a holding-to-
be-true (Fürwahrhalten) ‘of what I accept on moral grounds, and in such a way that I am 
certain that the opposite can never be proved’ (L 67).19 He even suggests that this form of 
‘practical conviction’ can be firmer than knowledge, because with knowledge ‘one still 
listens to opposed grounds, but not with belief, because here it does not depend on objective 
grounds but on the moral interest of the subject’ (L 72). Adorno could reply that the 
devastation of moral and ethical life that made the Holocaust possible has undermined the 
individual moral certainty that Kant presupposes in his arguments. In particular, Adorno 
argues that only a minimal ‘ethics of resistance’ is warranted in our radically evil world 
(Finlayson 2002, Freyenhagen 2013), and that this minimal ethics is characterised by 
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humility with regard to one’s moral and ethical convictions, including one’s ability to know 
what the right thing is, to do it, and to achieve the right outcome. While Kant suggests that 
moral belief in God and immortality is inextricably linked with individuals’ self-image as 
moral agents, Adorno suggests that modern individuals have lost faith in that self-image. As a 
result, their sense of moral obligation may not be accompanied by a sense of being justified 
in believing either that they are able to do the right thing or the truth of the Postulates which 
underwrite belief in that ability.20 
  
Adorno’s criticism of the Postulates of Pure Practical Reason and the Kantian hope they 
warrant does not entail a rejection of hope tout court. Adorno does consider himself a 
metaphysical thinker (M 177/114), and in the ‘Meditations on Metaphysics’ he argues that 
there is a conceptual space for radical hope in Kant’s critical philosophy. In the Meditation 
entitled ‘Mundus Intelligibilis’ Adorno criticises Kant’s conception of the intelligible sphere 
for its positivity (Positivität, ND 383/391). That is to say, Adorno criticises Kant for 
populating the intelligible sphere with concrete transcendent possibilities, which have to be 
affirmed in thought (God’s existence, immortality). For Adorno, on the other hand, the 
intelligible sphere is necessary because it shows that a different world is possible. The 
concept of the intelligible sphere ‘would be that of something which is not, and yet is not 
only not’ (ND 385/392), and in an important passage he sketches the reasons for this claim.  
The concept of the intelligible is the self-negation of finite spirit. In spirit, what 
merely is becomes aware of its lack; departure from existence that has become 
obdurate is the origin of that in spirit in which it is different from the principle of the 
domination of nature in it…spirit’s hostility to life would be nothing but despicable, if 
it did not issue in its self-reflection [Selbstbesinnung]. False is the asceticism it 
demands of others, good is its own. (ND 384–85/392) 
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In its reflection on the intelligible, reason realises its limitations. It is merely negatively 
thought (ND 384/392) as a space in which the possibility of a different world can be 
conceived. In conceiving such a space, reason renounces its claim to encompass the absolute, 
a claim Adorno attributes to the need for the domination of nature. Only this self-negation, 
the recognition of its finitude, which prevents reason from coming to rest, enables it to 
preserve a space where hope is still possible that some radical change may happen (ND 
398/406).21 Moreover, such self-negation negates those moments of reason, which Adorno 
criticises throughout his work, identity thinking, the domination of nature, and compulsive 
self-preservation. The recognition that there is more than this holds out the hope that 
everything may be different one day (I will return to this thought in §5 below). In this sense, 
the intelligible is as necessary for Adorno’s salvation of metaphysics as it was for Kant’s, but 
Adorno defends a form of it that is compatible with his negativism.22 And this conception of 
the intelligible sphere provides the conceptual space for radical hope, although, at this stage, 
it is not yet clear what would motivate people to hope for a better future. 
 
 
3. Hope Against Reason? 
As we have seen, Adorno characterises Kant’s rescue of metaphysics as ‘hope against 
reason’, motivated by the ‘unthinkability of despair’ (ND 378/385), and his criticism of the 
Postulates of Pure Practical Reason suggests that it is no longer rational to believe in God’s 
existence or in the immortality of the soul. However, while Kantian hope is subject to 
rationality constraints that makes it conditional upon belief in the Postulates, radical hope is 
not subject to the same constraints. Due to the unimaginable character of its objects, radical 
hope is ‘immune to empirical disappointment’ (Martin 2014: 101) brought about by 
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individual experience and collective history. At the same time, hope in all its forms is not a 
purely active, voluntary element of our rational agency. It is not something we do and can 
stop doing at will. Béatrice Han-Pile has argued in a recent paper that hope involves two 
forms of agential limitations: first, we experience the limits of our agency, because the 
eventuation of the hoped-for outcome is beyond our control; second, our agency also is 
limited, because whether we have hope for a particular outcome is beyond our control. Thus, 
we often feel impelled to hope in the face of adverse reasons or facts, while, conversely, 
when we are hopeless we cannot be talked into being hopeful through the listing of all the 
reasons there are for being hopeful (Han-Pile 2017: 179–84). 
 
Adorno’s own reflections on hope demonstrate its partially involuntary character. To see 
this, consider a remarkable exchange in Adorno’s correspondence with Thomas Mann. After 
the publication of Adorno’s In Search of Wagner, Mann sent his impressions of it to Adorno 
and quotes a passage from the book in which Adorno discusses the possibility that ‘a 
degenerating [verfallende] society develops the seeds of the society that will perhaps one day 
take its place’.23 Mann comments: ‘If there were only a single positive word, my honoured 
friend, that vouchsafed even the vaguest glimpse of the true society which we are forced to 
postulate! In this respect, and only this, your own reflections from damaged life say 
nothing’.24 In other words, Mann challenges Adorno to jettison his negativism and to give a 
positive indication of the better, future life that may be possible, a move that Adorno had 
ruled out in his criticism of Kant’s Postulate concerning God’s existence. Adorno’s response 
is revealing:  
If anything in Hegel, and in those who turned him right way up, has become part of 
my very flesh and blood, it is an asceticism with regard to any unmediated expression 
of the positive. This truly is a case of asceticism, believe me, since the opposite 
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impulse, a tendency to the unfettered expression of hope, really lies much closer to 
my own nature.25 
 
Adorno confesses to a psychological disposition to hope, but the reason why he refrains from 
expressing it is straightforwardly related to the critical aim of theory: ‘I have the constant 
feeling that we are merely encouraging the cause of untruth if we turn prematurely to the 
positive and fail to persevere in the negative’.26 This renders both ordinary and Kantian hope 
undesirable, because they violate Adorno’s negativism. He endorses a radical conception of 
hope that does not depend on the expression of any positive characterisation of the object of 
hope. However, given the partially involuntary character of hope, he still may harbour some 
hope, even though he refrains from expressing it.  
 
The correspondence between Adorno and Mann contains a similar remark related to 
immortality. Recall that Adorno’s criticism of the Postulate of the immortality of the soul is 
based on the idea that we can observe in old people a process of bodily and spiritual 
degeneration that makes it hard to believe that there is a ‘part of them that is not dying’ (ND 
364/371). However, in a letter to Thomas Mann, Adorno describes his own experience of his 
mother’s death in words that suggest a more complicated picture. Adorno writes:  
A couple of weeks ago my mother died in New York at the age of eighty-seven. And 
just because our last meeting was actually so sad – I hardly recognized her any more 
than she recognized herself – the final parting has affected me very deeply. With a 
loved one we are tempted to regard even the decline that accompanies extreme old 
age as a merely temporary state, and we can only hope that we are ultimately right to 
do so.27  
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Here Adorno seems to suggest that even when our loved ones are in terminal decline ‘we can 
only hope’ that this decline is only temporary. Of course, Adorno’s comment does not 
contain a direct reference to immortality, and it is possible to interpret it as an expression of 
his hope for his mother’s recuperation, but given her advanced age and Adorno’s clear 
understanding of her condition, it seems that even this hope in some sense would be the hope 
to defeat mortality, and therefore hope against reason. Yet, Adorno seems to confess 
harbouring such hope.28 
 
Adorno recognises, then, from his own experience, that hope is only partially voluntary. 
Our psychological disposition may induce us to harbour hope. He is acutely aware though 
that in the political realm ordinary or Kantian hope may encourage ‘the cause of untruth’, 
and, therefore, he embraces a cautious asceticism, a negativism of the imagination, with 
regard to any endorsement of positivity, that is, a refusal to engage in any positive expression 
of hope for a better future world that would render its shape more concrete. This leads us to 
Adorno’s criticism of the metaphysical need for hope and his insistence that courage to 
challenge the existing world depends on knowledge of the worst. 
 
 
4. The Metaphysical Need for Hope and Knowledge of the Worst 
According to Adorno, ‘in today’s resurrected metaphysics need usurps what it lacks’ (ND 
365/372). The danger of this usurpation is wishful thinking (ND 399/407). In particular, 
Adorno criticizes the tendency to move from a real or imagined metaphysical need that there 
be hope to the conclusion that there are reasons for hope, be it ordinary or Kantian. In 
contrast, he believes that if there is hope, it will be radical and reveal itself to us at the 
moment of our full insight into our predicament, as hopeless as this may seem. Thus, hope 
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comes after despair has been worked through. Any attempt to give people hope that avoids 
squaring up to our predicament manipulates them: ‘They are treated by metaphysics in 
fundamentally the same way as by the culture industry’ (M 195/124). Adorno develops this 
argument through the discussion of a conversation about Beckett that he had with his friend 
H.G. Adler, a Holocaust survivor and author of a well-known book on life in the 
concentration camp Theresienstadt. According to Adorno, Adler reacted with ‘violent affect’ 
against Beckett and said: ‘If Beckett had been in a concentration camp he probably would not 
write these despairing things; he’d write things which gave people courage [Mut]’ (M 
194/124).29 And, presumably, Adler thinks that ‘things that gave people courage’ are hopeful 
things. Adorno disagrees. He sees Adler’s sentiment as part of the ideological way in which 
metaphysical concepts are discussed at the time. They are endorsed, because people 
experience a need for metaphysical solace. His diagnosis of the problem is that 
[T]he situations in which people are forced to think ‘positively’ simply in order to 
survive are themselves situations of compulsion, which force people back on pure 
self-preservation, and in thinking only what they need to in order to survive in such a 
situation, to a point where the truth content of what they think is hopelessly 
undermined and utterly destroyed. (M 194–95/124) 
 
I think that what Adorno has in mind here is a stance of hopefulness as a psychological 
coping mechanism which people adopt defiantly, involuntarily or even unconsciously in 
order to come to terms with traumatic events, such as the Holocaust. As he sees it, if we 
adopt a hopeful stance out of desperation or, worse, if we are actively encouraged to be 
hopeful in these situations, we are manipulated and debased (M 195/124).30  
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In Adorno’s view, Beckett was lucky, not only because he was spared Adler’s horrific 
experiences, but also because, having been spared these experiences, he was able to express 
truthfully the despair that he felt in the face of our predicament and thereby to serve a critical 
aim. This critical aim is to squarely face the worst possible truth, that is, that the Holocaust 
happened, and that we still live in a radically evil world, and to think it through: 
If there is any way out of this hellish circle – and I would not wish to exaggerate that 
possibility, being well aware of the weakness and susceptibility of such consciousness 
– it is probably the ability of the intellect [Geist] to assimilate, to think the last 
extreme of horror and, in face of this intellectual [geistigen] experience, to gain 
mastery over it. (M 196/125, translation modified) 
 
This kind of mastery is intellectual and emotional at once. It enables the thinker to 
comprehend the worst and to stand above it, in some sense. As Adorno puts it, ‘in the ability 
not to feel manipulated, but to feel that one has gone relentlessly to the furthest extreme, 
there lies the only respect which is fitting: a respect for the possibility of the mind, despite 
everything, to raise itself however slightly above that which is’ (M 196/125). In this context, 
Adorno recalls that he and Horkheimer found reading Eugen Kogon’s book, The SS-State, 
‘immensely liberating’ (M 195–96/125).31 Adorno makes a similar claim in Minima Moralia 
when he introduces the second part of that book, which collects reflections written in 1945, 
with an aphorism by F.H. Bradley, which reads: ‘Where everything is bad / it must be good / 
to know the worst’ (MM 94/83). Given Adorno’s well-established views on the radically evil 
character of the modern world and the context of delusion (Verblendungszusammenhang) 
which prevents us from breaking out of it, why should it be good to know the worst? 
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The answer, I think, is that contrary to what Adler thought, it is exactly this process of 
working through and reflecting on the despair occasioned by the Holocaust that can instil 
courage in people which will enable them to remain critical of the wrong life and to resist it 
where possible. To see this, we need to understand the relationship between radical hope and 
courage.  
 
According to Lear, in the most general terms, courage, as a human excellence or virtue, is 
‘the capacity for living well with the risks that inevitably attend human existence’ (Lear 
2006: 121). So understood, radical hope may be both a necessary constituent and a 
manifestation of courage (Lear 2006: 123). It is a necessary constituent, because courage may 
require the capacity to live with conceptual loss, where established structures of meaning and 
significance no longer apply, and radical hope is required in order to believe in the possibility 
of conceptual renewal. It is a manifestation of courage, if it is well deployed in order to 
enable the courageous person to judge well the risks of life. As Lear sees it, Plenty Coups 
needed radical hope in order to have the courage to lead the Crow into an unknown future, 
and his capacity to do so well manifested his radical hope in that future. Likewise, Adorno is 
concerned with the courage to live in the wake of the Holocaust, and this form of courage 
seems to rely on radical hope, not only for the possibility of continued living, but also for his 
capacity to resist the wrong life and to fight for a better one with the means of critical theory. 
Here, Adorno agrees with Kant: ‘Without hope there is no good [Ohne Hoffnung ist kein 
Gutes]’ (ND 272/276).32 At the same time, Adorno’s courage in confronting the past, 
working through and reflecting on the Holocaust, manifests the radical hope that it is possible 
to liberate oneself from disabling despair in the face of what happened and discloses a new 
space of future possibility, even if it is completely indeterminate.  
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At this point, we can return to the distinction between Lear’s and Adorno’s conceptions 
of radical hope. While Plenty Coups finds in the Crow past ready resources for courage and 
hope, for Adorno the past is a vast reservoir of devastation and human suffering. Working 
through the past and understanding it as fully as possible enables Adorno to move from 
despair to hope, because it ensures that we understand the full force of our predicament and 
guards against the temptation of ordinary hope. As we have seen, Adorno is aware that ‘the 
possible’ blocks the path to utopia. As long as we believe that we have enough real or 
imaginative resources to picture a determinate better, future world, we have not escaped the 
spell.  
 
Moreover, reflection on the history of the modern world, including a detailed 
understanding of the processes that led to the Holocaust, enables us to see the historical 
specificity and contingent character of these processes. We can see that the Holocaust was 
neither a natural nor a necessary outcome of human history, even if the dialectic of 
enlightenment establishes a relationship between the pathological practices of self-
preservation and the domination of nature on the one hand, and the Holocaust on the other. It 
is good to know the worst, here understood as the precise details of the horrors of the 
Holocaust, then, because this knowledge denaturalises it and therefore liberates us by 
opening up the possibility of an alternative future in which ‘Auschwitz will not repeat itself’ 
(ND 358/365). In this sense, the negative character of thought (in the Hegelian sense of 
negating what it encounters as given) is itself a possible source of hope.33 
 
 
5. Reasons for Hope 
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In addition, Adorno suggests at least two further reasons for hope: (1) there is an objective 
possibility of addressing some of the social suffering that afflicts the world because of the 
development of the forces of production, and (2) some metaphysical experiences offer a 
promesse de bonheur, which can serve as a placeholder for a future good without itself being 




In the Introduction to Negative Dialectics, Adorno contrasts the wrong state of affairs in 
which we live with ‘the concrete possibility’ of utopia (ND 22/11). He introduces this 
contrast immediately following a comment about the fact that even in the most capitalist 
societies the focus on exchange cannot eliminate the centrality of use value for the 
maintenance of life. This could be understood as an allusion to Marx’s claim that in such 
societies the relations of production become fetters on the forces of production, that is, the 
social organisation of production and exchange in capitalism makes impossible the full use of 
productive capacities which could satisfy everyone’s basic needs and overcome social 
suffering. Elsewhere, Adorno reflects on the fact that the development of the forces of 
production has progressed to the point where nobody would need to suffer hunger (Adorno 
1976: 62/ GS 8: 347; CM 96/ GS 10.2: 564); yet, hunger persists even in wealthy capitalist 
societies due to the way in which production and exchange are organised. This suggests that 
there is a ‘concrete’ or ‘objective’ rather than merely logical possibility that some good could 
be brought about in our world, and this surely is a reason for hope. However, Adorno is not 
naïve. Such hope remains radical hope for two reasons. First, we currently cannot conceive of 
the concrete steps that we would need to take in order to abolish hunger in the world (and, 
similarly, meet everyone’s other basic needs), and we do not fully understand the nature of 
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the obstacles that prevent us from doing so. Second, the merely negative goal of abolishing 
hunger does not give us a positive image of a good society. Freyenhagen’s negative 
Aristotelianism illustrates this claim: knowledge of the bad arises from finding out of what is 
bad for us qua animals (e.g. hunger), but this doesn’t tell us what would be good for us qua 
humans. We simply do not know what forms of flourishing would open up for us in a world 
in which hunger has been abolished (Freyenhagen 2013: 240). Nevertheless, given the 
concrete or objective possibility of abolishing hunger, it seems reasonable to hope that we 
will achieve it in the future, and that this eventually may lead to the establishment of a better, 





Adorno also suggests that ‘metaphysical experience’ can give us reasons for hope, if we are 
lucky enough to have such experiences.34 To be sure, the concept of metaphysical experience 
is difficult to grasp, and I won’t be able to do it justice here. Rather, I will sketch the general 
shape of the argument and refer the reader to fuller discussions in the existing secondary 
literature (see especially Foster 2007; Jarvis 1998: Ch. 8; Bernstein 2001: Ch. 9; Zuidervaart 
2007a: Ch. 2, 2007b). Metaphysical experience of objects is experience in a manner that is 
not tainted by identitarian, formal or instrumental thinking. Adorno’s examples include 
modern art works, the evocation of village names, landscapes and a character in a novel (the 
Duchesse de Guermantes in Proust’s À la recherche du temps perdu, ND 366/373), or even a 
dog, wagging its tail in a concentration camp (ND 373/380).35 
 
 27
In the case of art works, the argument is that they serve as a promesse de bonheur, a 
promise of happiness that they contain in virtue of their essential nature as semblance 
(Schein).36 Modern art works, in particular, are semblances, because their appearance and 
meaning in virtue of which they command our attention give them a different kind of reality 
from the empirical objects that we use every day. The promise contained in the art work’s 
semblance is that of non-semblance (ND 397/405). Given that modern art works are not 
semblances of anything actual, they are semblances of otherness as such. Thus, their 
semblance is ‘an appearing and showing of transcendence’, but not transcendence itself 
(Bernstein 2001: 435).37 As Finlayson puts it, works of art ‘provoke the expectation of 
happiness, an expectation grounded in the present, but whose fulfilment lies in the future. The 
expectation is not just a wish, projected onto the work. It is more like a hope raised by the 
work itself’ (Finlayson 2012: 395). On this interpretation, experiencing works of art can 
generate reasons for radical hope. 
 
Metaphysical experiences elicited by village names, landscapes, fictional characters, or 
tail-wagging dogs are ‘fugitive experiences’ (Bernstein 2001: 437) whose unifying feature is 
the fact that they are experienced as ‘absolutely and insolubly individuated’, and therefore 
removed from the spell of identity and commensurability. Paradoxically, in this instance, it is 
the very ‘thing-like’ character of these objects, their seeming immediacy, which makes them 
objects of metaphysical experience:  
The smallest inner-worldly traits would be of relevance to the absolute, for the 
micrological view cracks the shells of what, measured by the subsuming general 
concept, is helplessly individuated and explodes its identity, the delusion that it is a 
mere specimen [den Trug, es wäre bloß Exemplar]. Such thinking shows solidarity 
with metaphysics at the moment of its fall. (ND 400/408) 
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The reconciliation that is achieved in such experiences consists in a non-instrumental and 
non-dominating subject-object relation that implies a critique of the existing relations 
between subject and object, which are instrumental and dominating. The fact that such 
metaphysical experience is possible can give us hope that a better, future world may be 
possible, too, and this hope can give us the courage we need to fight for social change. 
 
To be sure, if substantive negativism is true, then these phenomena cannot be proper 
instances of the good that persist in the evil world, and even if substantive negativism was 
false, epistemic negativism means that they would be unrecognisable as such. To dispel the 
worry that metaphysical experience is incompatible with negativism, we need to spell out 
exactly what the relationship between metaphysical experience and the good is. 
Commentators like Jarvis (1998: 211–16) and Bernstein (2001: 437–51) draw on passages in 
which Adorno seems to concede the necessity of positive otherness being present in 
experience. Thus, alluding to Hegel’s famous phrase, Adorno writes that ‘consciousness 
could not even despair over the grey, did it not harbour the notion of a different colour, 
whose dispersed traces are not absent from the negative whole’ (ND 370/377–78). The 
argument is conceptual; despair cannot be total, because despairing requires some non-
negative element in the world (Jarvis 1998: 212–13; Bernstein 2001: 437–8).38 However, 
while this argument shows that fleeting moments of happiness and of otherness can be found 
in our radically evil world, their entanglement with radical evil and their fugitive character 
mean that they cannot be conceptualised, used and reproduced in the same way as other 
events. In particular, Adorno does not think that the phenomena he describes are traces of the 
good in the sense that they could underwrite a normative ethics. Rather, they are ephemeral 
reminders of the possibility of non-instrumental or non-dominating relationships that offer 
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hope, if they are experienced in this way. They remain promissory of future happiness and 
otherness (Bernstein 2001: 439).  
  
Moreover, Adorno thinks that possession of the capacity to have metaphysical 
experiences of this kind itself is a matter of luck, because it depends on a particular form of 
upbringing that involves habituation into such experiences, and the ability to be affected by 
them (ND 51/41). It is not implausible, although, of course, regrettable that such 
metaphysical experience is not possible for everyone. In fact, what sometimes has been 
criticised as an anti-democratic and elitist aspect of Adorno’s thought, in fact, may be the 
beginning of an explanation of the involuntary character of hope in those who are disposed to 
it. That is, it may explain why some people seem naturally hopeful in the face of adverse 
conditions, while others are not. And, as we have seen in §3 above, it also may be that people 
who are naturally hopeful find it easier to be cautiously ascetic about the expression of their 
hope, than those whose metaphysical need leads them to false hope. As Bernstein puts it, ‘if 
an empirical metaphysical experience offers hope…the parading of such would undermine 
the strategic ethical orientation of [Adorno’s] writing’ (Bernstein 2001: 441).  
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, I have argued that Adorno defends a radical conception of hope. It is radical, 
because it is hope for a better, future world that leaves the character of this world entirely 
indeterminate, but holds out hope for its possibility and motivates us to resist the wrong 
world that we inhabit now. Adorno believes that hope must be radical in this sense, because 
he is committed to a negativism about the good that is epistemic and imaginative: we can 
neither know nor imagine the good. His conception of hope differs from ordinary hope, 
Kantian hope, and Lear’s conception of radical hope. It does not have determinate empirical 
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objects or require moral belief in transcendent objects that would warrant hope. And it does 
not require a belief in the essential goodness of the world, human civilisation or the past. It 
does require, however, that we understand and explain the radically evil world that we inhabit 
at the moment, because it is this activity (the explanatory-diagnostic function of critical 
theory) that facilitates courage and hope (the anticipatory-utopian function of critical theory). 
Moreover, our best efforts to know the worst are not enough. Adorno clearly recognises an 
involuntary element in hope. Ultimately, whether we are hopeful is not up to us, but Adorno 
offers the beginnings of an account of what might make a difference: there are reasons for 
hope, including the idea that critical thought itself may give rise to hope, hints of the 
‘concrete’ possibility of utopia (albeit in the very limited sense described in §5.1 above), and 
a particular capacity to be affected by the world through metaphysical experience. This is 
very different from the metaphysical framework that Plenty Coups had at his disposal, and 
perhaps a more appropriate explanation for the vagaries of hope for those of us who do not 
share Plenty Coups’ or any other religious commitments.  
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but he doesn’t distinguish imaginative negativism as a distinct form of negativism. 
5
 Note that, according to Lear, the conception of divinity itself may change (Lear 2006: 
98). 
6
 However, it may provide us with robust negative values that would enable us to judge 
what such a future ought not to be like (Freyenhagen 2013).   
7
 Similarly, Adorno writes: ‘To this day, all happiness is a pledge of what has not yet 
been, and the belief in its imminence obstructs its becoming’ (ND 346/352). 
8
 For a similar interpretation to the one offered here, see Macdonald (2011: 40–46). 
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9
 For example, Adorno refers to the ‘utopia of cognition’ as a state in which we would be 
able ‘to open up the non-conceptual with concepts, without making it the same as them’ (ND 
21/10). 
10
 Note that this is true even if substantive negativism is false. Since we cannot reliably 
pick out the good, we could not identify an untainted possible future if we happened to 
stumble upon one.  
11
 The three ‘models’ of negative dialectics that Adorno offers in the second half of the 
book correspond to these three propositions, although Adorno transforms their direction. The 
first model deals with freedom, the second deals with the philosophy of history, and, 
therefore, with the question of whether there is meaning and progress in history, a secular 
way of asking whether God has a plan for us. Finally, the third model deals with the 
possibility of metaphysics and metaphysical experience itself; it includes discussions of 
theodicy and immortality, but it also draws together the insights of the whole book and 
considers what we may hope, even though the discussion is not explicitly framed as a 
discussion of hope. For a slightly different mapping see Jameson (1997: 73–77). 
The three ‘models’ also can be interpreted as answers to Kant’s three questions: ‘What 
can we know? What should we do? And What may we hope?’ (A804–805/B832–833). On 
this interpretation, the first question concerns knowledge of the meaning and progress of 
humanity. 
12
 In the Dialectic of Enlightenment, Adorno and Horkheimer capture this insight in a 
harrowing passage: ‘The domination of nature draws the circle into which the Critique of 
Pure Reason banished thought. Kant combined the doctrine of thought’s restlessly toilsome 
progress toward infinity with insistence on its insufficiency and eternal limitation. His 
judgment is an oracle. There is no being in the world that science cannot penetrate, but what 
can be penetrated by science is not being’ (DdA 43/19–20). 
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13
 As Shuster puts it (2014: 40–41), Adorno does take Kantian morality as an attempt to 
avoid the dialectic of enlightenment. 
14
 Martin (2014: 103, note 11) acknowledges the distinction but then argues that moral 
faith is a specific form of hope: hope plus confidence (105).  
15
 For more on this distinction and Kant’s theory of real possibility see Stang (2016). 
16
 As will become clear in what follows, for Adorno, hope must be based on a form of 
possibility that is weaker than real possibility but stronger than logical possibility See also 
Macdonald (2011: 45).  
17
 It is worth noting that Adorno appeals to the process of ageing and dying in order to 
make a more specific point about the horrific process of dying in Auschwitz. As a result, it 
looks as if our ability to hope for immortality is imperilled not only by Auschwitz, but also 
by witnessing loved ones who suffer from the kinds of illnesses that destroy people’s 
personalities, such as Alzheimer and other forms of Dementia. (I assume that when Adorno 
writes ‘without illness’ he means ‘without physical illness, since the ‘crumbling’ of the ego 
through Alzheimer or Dementia clearly is an illness.).   
18
 It is not clear why Adorno thinks that living an impoverished life should decrease 
rather than increase one’s hope for immortality. Perhaps he thinks that it is difficult to 
imagine a better, future life if one’s current life is characterized by the decline of one’s 
powers and one cannot imagine what a better life would look like.  
19
 In fact, ‘[t]he only objects that are matters of belief are those in which holding-to-be-
true is necessarily free, i.e., is not determined through objective grounds of truth that are 
independent of the nature and the interest of the subject…Thus also on account of its merely 
subjective grounds, believing yields no conviction that can be communicated and that 
commands universal agreement, like the conviction that comes from knowledge. Only I 
myself can be certain of the validity and unalterability of my practical belief, and my belief in 
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the truth of a proposition of the actuality of a thing is what takes the place of a cognition only 
in relation to me without itself being a cognition’ (L 70). 
20
 For a similar conclusion see Shuster (2014: 128), who writes that ‘Adorno’s basic 
contention is that reconciliation with our present world is prohibited.’ Since Adorno comes to 
reject the Postulates, he finds himself in a conceptual space that is very different from Kant’s, 
but he arrives at it through reflection on the problems with Kant’s conceptual space. I am 
grateful to an anonymous reviewer for alerting me to Shuster’s framing of Adorno’s point.  
21
 Michael Theunissen has pointed to the irony of Adorno’s resurrection of the intelligible 
sphere after all of his work in demolishing it. But I think that Adorno’s conception of it is 
very different from Kant’s in that it is entirely indeterminate (Theunissen 1983: 60). 
22
 Like Adorno, Kant thinks that we cannot know anything about the intelligible sphere, 
but he does think that we can conceive of immortality and God’s existence and have faith in 
it. Adorno seems to deny this too.  
23
 ISW: 143/153; quoted in Mann’s letter to Adorno, 30 October 1952, in Adorno and 
Mann (2006: 93). I have modified the translation, rendering verfallende as ‘degenerating’ 
rather than as ‘decadent’. 
24
 Letter to Adorno, 30 October 1952, in Adorno and Mann (2006: 93). ‘Reflections from 
Damaged Life’ is the subtitle of Adorno’s Minima Moralia. 
25
 Letter to Mann, 1 December 1952, in Adorno and Mann (2006: 97). Those who turned 




 Letter to Mann, 13 April 1952, in Adorno and Mann (2006: 78–79). 
28
 Incidentally, Adorno seems to think that the hope for immortality occupies a special 
place in all utopian longing. In Negative Dialectics Adorno criticises Christianity for 
spiritualising resurrection: ‘hope means a physical resurrection and feels defrauded of the 
 39
                                                                                                                                                        
best part by its spiritualization [Vergeistigung]’ (ND 393/401). (This is a peculiar claim, 
because much Christian doctrine in fact does hold out hope for resurrection of the ‘glorious 
body’.) It is worth noting that for Walter Benjamin, who had an immense influence on 
Adorno’s thinking about these issues, hope for immortality is concerned with the immortality 
of those who are dead already, rather than the living. This is the point of the famous last line 
of his essay on Goethe’s Elective Affinities: ‘Only for the sake of the hopeless have we been 
given hope’ (Benjamin [1924–25] 1996: 356; see also my remarks in note 38 below). 
In a conversation with Ernst Bloch, Adorno also suggests that the concept of utopia has a 
contradictory relationship to death. On the one hand, ‘without the notion of an unfettered life, 
freed from death, the idea of utopia, the idea of the utopia, cannot even be thought at all’ 
(quoted in Bloch 1987: 10). On the other hand, death, as limit (Schwelle), must be thought as 
well for utopia to be possible. And Adorno concludes from this contradiction that ‘one may 
not cast a picture of utopia in a positive manner’ (quoted in Bloch 1987: 10), presumably 
because it is not possible to comprehend something that is contradictory. This explains why 
the hope for immortality is radical hope, and is much weaker than the moral belief or faith in 
immortality that Kant thought warranted.  
29
 In Negative Dialectics Adorno summarises the exchange slightly differently: ‘if he had 
been in Auschwitz, he would write differently, namely, with the trench religion 
[Schützengrabenreligion] of an escapee, more positively’ (ND 360/367). 
30
 This view is compatible with the view that hope is not entirely voluntary, because the 
manipulation that Adorno has in mind could work by creating an environment in which 
(false) hope is likely to flourish.  
31
 Kogon’s book, Der SS-Staat, published in 1946, is one of the first historical analyses of 
the Nazi system. 
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32
 Of course, this only renders hope a necessary condition of possibility for the good, not 
a sufficient one. 
33
 For the related idea that criticism of reification, that is, the denaturalisation of 
seemingly natural social phenomena, already is an element of freedom, see Jütten (2011). 
34
 I will return to this qualification below. 
35
 Foster (2007) is very good at explaining why any such break-outs of identity thinking 
will be ephemeral rather than more permanent, and, therefore, why they can be found in 
Proust but not in e.g. Husserl, Bergson or McDowell. 
36
 I take both the idea that art works serve as a promesse de bonheur and that they do so 
in virtue of their essential nature as semblance from Bernstein (2001: 435–37). For an 
excellent discussion of Adorno’s use of the phrase promesse de bonheur, see Finlayson 
(2012). 
37
 The idea that semblance gives rise to hope, even though it is semblance rather than the 
reality of what it resembles (e.g. reconciliation) is central to Benjamin’s interpretation of 
Goethe’s Elective Affinities (Benjamin [1924–25] 1996: 355; cf. Friedlander 2012: 211).  
38
 In this context, Adorno quotes Benjamin’s famous conclusion from the Elective 
Affinities essay: ‘Only for the sake of the hopeless have we been given hope’ (ND 371/378; 
cf. Benjamin [1924–25] 1996: 356 and my remarks in note 28 above). The thought may be 
that reflection on past suffering gives rise to the idea of messianic justice in which that 
suffering still could be undone or at least be remembered in a way that affords closure. Hope 
is given to us, but it is for the sake of those who suffered in the past. It is because we cannot 
accept the finality of that suffering that despair cannot be total. This argument, which differs 
from the one I discuss in the main text, requires extensive metaphysical commitments that 
sound more Benjaminian than Adornian to me. 
